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The Auditors' Role in Aristotelian Rhetoric

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For the most part in the history of Greek and Roman writing on rhetoric the auditors' contribution to discourse has not been seen as something significant. From the evidence at our disposal, the auditor is usually viewed as a passive presence. He was, of course, recognized by those who wrote on rhetoric as the object of any practical or theoretical suggestions made to the speaker but solely as one whose attention was to be caught, his reason convinced, his emotions and feelings aroused; all to gain his support for and acceptance of what the speaker proposed. In fact, one might say that attention was devoted exclusively to the speaker and to the ways whereby he might achieve his goal successfully. Thus we hear much of invention, style, argumentation, and parts of speech. This emphasis on the speaker is quite visible in the one rhetorical handbook which has come down to us from among the many of ancient Greece. This is Anaximenes' Ars Rhetorica, commonly known as the Rhetoric to Alexander. The same limited perspective is reflected in comments on teachers of rhetoric by two men who entertained a larger understanding of rhetorical discourse, for example, that of Plato in the "Phaedrus" (266d-268a), or Isocrates' dismissive remarks about "those who promise to teach political discourse" or those "who dared to compose the so-called arts of rhetoric" ("Against the Sophists," 9,

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16). It is seen, too, in works like the Rhetorica ad Herennium and Cicero’s De Inventione that are derivatives of the Greek handbooks of rhetoric. This understanding of the auditor is also taken to be that of Aristotle in his Rhetoric. However, this treatise on rhetoric, which either by reason of its virtuosity and excellence or a chance accident of history has survived into the present as the only example from ancient Greece of a serious study of the art of discourse, deserves a further look.

For the Rhetoric is unique in a number of ways: It is a treatise on discourse given to us by one of the most distinguished minds in Western thought. It is not a handbook on the techniques of good speaking but an analysis of the nature of language when it is used by men to communicate effectively with others by the spoken (or written) word. Furthermore, it is an analysis that assumes and rests upon the author’s philosophical commitments in ethics, psychology, political science, dialectic, and logic. To the best of our knowledge it is a work of his maturity, and possibly the fruition of a continuing interest in the discipline as indicated by the references in later literature to rhetorical works of his such as Gryllus, Theodectea, and A Compilation of Rhetorical Handbooks. Furthermore, it stands alone among Greek, Latin, and later rhetorical works as a well-articulated and comprehensive grasp of the essentials of the art (Grimaldi, 1972). The Rhetoric (as all else that Aristotle took up) is an effort to come to an understanding of the kind of thing discourse is when it is used in the attempt to communicate effectively with others. It is not a handbook of 10 easy lessons on how to be a successful or popular speaker. If one should insist that it is, then it can be said with the same assurance that the Poetics is an exercise book on how to write poems like the real poets.

Among notable contributions to be found in the Rhetoric is a study of the emotions in the second book. This study, as far as can be known, is unique for its own time and indeed for centuries later, and still commands attention. It is described in a recent book on emotion thus: “This picture of emotions . . . is by and large the correct one” (Lyons, 1980, p. 34).

Apart from its excellence as a critique of the nature of the various emotions (i.e., the state of the person experiencing the emotion, the things which cause the emotion, the persons toward whom it is experi-enced), this detailed analysis has the practical purpose of alerting the speaker to the auditor and the changes which can occur in him and thus affect what he hears. Indeed, from what Aristotle says such an awareness is clearly intended to help the speaker dispose the auditors to cooperate with him, for as he says, “matters appear in a different guise to those who love and to those who hate and to those who are angry and to those free from anger” (1377b31-1378a3). Clearly, in Aristotle’s view this study of emotion is not meant to enable the speaker to manipulate the auditor and twist him about by arousing an unjustified and irrational emotional response, and so corrupting his judgment, since such a use of emotions is strongly condemned in the opening chapter (e.g., 135a16-26).

In Aristotle’s Rhetoric the sense of the primary importance of the auditors as cooperating partners in discourse is present from the beginning and is clearly stated. We are told early on that the function of rhetoric as a technique is not to persuade the auditors, but to discover those aspects in the subject under discussion which are suasive (1355b10-11); we learn, too, that rhetoric is the ability to discover that which is possibly suasive in any subject (1555b25-34), but “the suasive is that which is suasive to someone” (1356b28). In the Rhetoric, the someone is the auditor who is thereby enabled to arrive at a judgment. In fact, the auditors (ὁκροστατίς) as judges (κρίταις) are the final telos of the whole rhetorical praxis. Aristotle makes this clear when, in the third of the three opening programmatic chapters of the first book, he examines the proximate and the ultimate telos of each kind of rhetoric (1358a36-b29). There we learn that the auditors are the final goal of all rhetorical discourse, for they are the ones who must reach a judgment on their own when that which is possibly suasive on the subject has been placed before them (1355b10-11, 26-27, 32-34). In this kind of role, in which they must make a judgment on their own, the auditors cannot be totally passive partners completely subject to the technical skills of the speaker. They are viewed rather as nonspeaking partners actively engaged in the exchange taking place between speaker and auditor. Aristotle understood rhetorical discourse to be an eminently reasonable activity; purely passive auditors make it an exercise in the irrational.
Thus it is that when we turn to a pivotal part of his rhetorical theory, the entechnic pisteis, as he names them, we are confronted with a problem. These pisteis—logos (reason), pathos (emotion), and ethos (character)—direct the entire process of invention apart from (at least formally) the atechnic proofs (laws, witnesses, etc.). They are called entechnic because they submit to the reasoned activity of the speaker and form an organic, logical whole for the development of argument. Aristotle describes them in this way: "entechnic pisteis are those that can be provided by ourselves and the methodology of rhetoric" (1355b37-38). Rooted in rational and psychological sources, they provide evidentiary material of a probative quality (thus the term πιστεῖς (pistis)) that enables the auditors by means of the speaker to move on their own toward a decision. As pisteis they are presented as coequally and, depending upon how one interprets the meaning of ἤθος, they receive relatively equal treatment.

It is the meaning of ἤθος (ethos) as entechnic pistis that is the problem. Does it mean simply and exclusively the ἤθος of the speaker? Or does it signify as well the ἤθος of the auditors, an ἤθος which the speaker must know and whose probative force he must utilize in his argument? If this last is so, it would present us with further evidence of Aristotle's acceptance of the active presence of the auditors in discourse. It is this point that this chapter would like to argue.

The common interpretation of ἤθος as entechnic pistis is that it signifies the speaker's ἤθος alone as Aristotle identifies it (1356a2). There are contra-indications in the text, both extrinsic and intrinsic, that such an interpretation is not correct. Let us look at the extrinsic first, not because they prove the incorrectness, but because they locate the problem more clearly and reveal the difficulties attached to such an interpretation.

First of all, there are structural difficulties. After naming the three entechnic pisteis, Aristotle devotes I.4-14 to the explanation of logos and II.2-11 to pathos. (The only explanation of the speaker's ἤθος is at 1379a7-20, with a reference to I.9 as support.) But, as this reference (1379a16-19) also indicates, I.9 presents the ways to show the ἤθος of others as well. A sketchy 14 lines versus 11 and 10 chapters is certainly a skewed structure for key concepts, but not impossible. Some...
Rhetoric. Aristotle does not explain the meaning of ἔθος as he uses it in the Rhetoric. To say, however, that it carries the ordinary meaning found in the ethical works (i.e., moral character) 6 would be a secure statement. We can arrive at an understanding of its meaning in the Rhetoric from what Aristotle calls its root idea, Ἐθός (1369b6-7). 7 This is the name given to an action repeatedly done by a person. Thus, at 1370a6 τὰ ἔθη refer to specifically different actions repeatedly performed by an individual. As we are told there (1370a6-9) this manner of acting is like, but not the same as, that which flows from our nature. In fact, Ἐθος is said to be like a second nature (EN 1152a20-32). Ἐθος, as an action done over and over is the ground for what Aristotle calls ἔθεις (habit, acquired habit) which is important for determining the meaning of ἔθος. A ἔθεις is a disposition present in the individual that receives the effect of a repeated action and so becomes further disposed for doing that action (EN 1103b7-25 and see 21b; 1114a9-10). 8 Such ἔθεις (stable dispositions) together with δυνάμεις (capacities), and παθήν (transitory motions proceeding from the capacities), are present in what Aristotle calls the aletic (appetitive) part of the psyche (EN 1105b19-28; EE1220b7-20). The dynamics appear to have no specific determination from nature (EE 1220a38-b6) and may be influenced one way or another. This influence comes from the hexeis which shape the dynamics to function in a certain way (EE 1105b23-28; EE 1220b16-20). If a dynamic is shaped partly under the direction of reason by an elective hexis (ἔθεις προοριζέται) to a habitual way of acting in the area of moral activity, the result is a firm direction of the person toward or away from the good proper to man. Such a tendency toward or away from the standard of goodness proper to man Aristotle calls virtue or vice. He also calls it ἔθος (EE 1221b32-34; Poetics 1448a2-4), or what we call moral character. This is a meaning found frequently in the Rhetoric; 9 certainly it is the meaning presumed to be present by those who talk of the speaker’s ἔθος as entechnic pistis. For their supporting evidence, 1378a7-20 and I.9 have in mind the moral character of the speaker. Moral character is also the meaning found in II.12-17. These chapters in reality are a presentation of patterned ways of acting which are both typical and indicative of a good or bad moral character. 10 In fact when Aristotle speaks of ἔθος, either as he specifies it for the speaker (1378a7-20) or describes it for the auditor (II.12-17), he is speaking of “moral character.” This may well be the way one should think of ἔθος as entechnic pistis. 11

If one were to make specific the meaning of ἔθος as found in the Rhetoric, it could be described in this way: ἔθος is a firm disposition in a person formed partly under the direction of reason (EE 1220b5-7) with respect to that part of the appetitive soul represented by the emotions; this firm disposition reflects the quality of the individual’s dominant habits in the sphere of moral activity. 12 In brief, it denotes a stable and established attitude in a person with respect to good or bad moral actions, an attitude which is the result of some kind of reasoned and repetitive activity.

This is the meaning of ἔθος (singular, plural) in all of its 58 appearances in the Rhetoric, omitting 1413b31 which is not certain. What is evident, however, from the instances is that any exclusive reference in them to the speaker’s ἔθος as entechnic pistis is minimal. For example:

- 4 clear instances pertain to the speaker’s ἔθος as entechnic pistis (1356a2, 5, 13; 1366a26) while 3 others probably do the same (1359a23, 26-27; 1418b23).
- 4 instances can only be the ἔθος of others as entechnic pistis: 1366a13, 14-15; 1390a26-27; 1391b20-21.
- in 1 use the ἔθος of both the speaker and another is denoted indirectly as entechnic pistis: 1376a28.
- in 43 instances ἔθος signifies or can signify the ἔθος of the speaker, or auditors, or others, and it is an ἔθος which is a probable force (i.e., entechnic pistis). Some instances are 1356a23; 1376a25; 1384b11, 12-13; 1395b14; and 1417a17-24.
- there are 3 uses where “moral character” is a possible meaning. But equally possible is: “a trait, quality of character,” “characteristic” (e.g., 1390b29, 1391a20-21, 1391b2).

This extensive use of ἔθος as moral character and signifying either directly or indirectly the ἔθος of the auditors or others as entechnic pistis causes one to question an interpretation which confines it to the first category. Furthermore, when we look at the passages that seemingly refer clearly to the speaker’s ἔθος as entechnic pistis, it is somewhat difficult to understand what can be meant by the text. For
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without a knowledge and a use of the auditors' ἕθος by the speaker (i.e., employing the auditors' ἕθος as entechnē pistis) the text statements are unclear. For example, at 1356a4-13 the speaker's ἕθος as entechnē pistis cannot be totally divorced from his knowledge and use of the auditors' ἕθος. The crucial words are at 1356a5-6: ἀξίωσις τοῦ ἑπεξεργασθείσα. How can the speaker present himself as "worthy of belief," "a good man" without an understanding and use of the ἕθος of his audience? Both are qualities to which different audiences respond in different ways, for example, the old, the young, the uneducated, and the cultivated to name a few. In fact, in the other passage (1366a8-16) where Aristotle also has the speaker's ἕθος in mind, he notes that the speaker must know the ἕθος of different kinds of government (the subject of 1.8) and must do so "since its own ἕθος is necessarily (ἀνάγκη εἶναι) most suasive with respect to each." Indeed Aristotle himself points explicitly to this role of the ἕθος of others, particularly the auditors, as entechnē proof when he says at the end of II.13 (1390a25-28): "Such, then, are the ἔθη of the young and old. Consequently, since men give a favorable hearing to discourse which is addressed to and in accord with their own ἕθος, it is quite clear how the speakers by the language they employ will reflect such character both in themselves and in their discourse." This observation sets forth unambiguously what he thinks to be the purpose of his presentation of ἕθος in II.12-17. In fact, cc. 12-17 (owing to the method Aristotle uses to develop these varied "characters") are related to his brief treatment of the speaker's ἕθος at II.1 (1378a7-20). In this passage at II.1, he mentions three components which he considers essential for a speaker's ἕθος if it is to influence the auditors and win their favor: sound judgment (φρόνησις), moral integrity (ἀρετή), and good will (εὐνομία). In his examination of the ἕθος of others (cc. 12-17) as it is affected by age and fortune (1388b31-32: κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ τὰς τύχας) these are the qualities which appear (unnamed as such) continually in the analyses. A brief example from the first character studied, that of the young, will illustrate this: sound judgment in the young is limited (1389a17-26, b5-7); moral integrity is changeable (1389a3-16, 35-37); and good will is present (1389a37-b2, b8-11).

The intrinsic indications are such that those who insist that Aristotle meant that ἕθος as entechnē pistis was exclusively that of the speaker must offer a more satisfactory explanation than the statements at 1356a1-13 and 1378a7-20 along with I.9. This is particularly true when we reflect upon Aristotle's statements about the auditors and the role he assigns them in discourse. Aristotle has made the auditor the telos of rhetorical discourse (1358a36-b8) and judgment (κρίσις) on his part essential to the whole process (1358b2-8, 1377b21, 1391b8ff.). By themselves, these two facts offer an argument to include the auditors' ἕθος under the term ἕθος as entechnē pistis. For in such a perception of rhetoric the speaker, to be effective, must always recognize and utilize the fact that he is speaking to a certain kind of audience with a particular set of established attitudes, interests, intellectual and emotional convictions, desires, and needs, all of which flow into the judgments and decisions they make. In brief it is this ἕθος, as Aristotle tells us at 1369a7-31, that affects a person's decisions and judgments: "And in general all the circumstances which cause men's characters to differ (must be considered), for example if a man views himself as rich or poor . . . this will make a difference in him." He ends this comment (1369a28-31) by stating that he will discuss these matters later. This is commonly understood to mean the discussion at II.12-17, even by those who maintain that the speaker's ἕθος is the only entechnē pistis.

From the tenor of the remarks in cc. 12-17, it is clear that the only purpose they serve is to call attention to the ἕθος of different kinds of auditors. The ostensible purpose for doing this is unavoidable, namely, to alert the speaker to the fact that he must attend to and adjust himself to the type of auditors addressed if he is to address them successfully. But to say this is to say that the auditors' ἕθος is an entechnē pistis. This would also be the conclusion one would draw from the comment at 1369a7-31, that at 1390a25-28, from the indications given by the transitional statements made in II.1, and from the general use of ἕθος in the Rhetoric. The success or failure of what the speaker wishes to convey is contingent upon the kind of cooperative listening response he evokes from his knowledge of the auditors. As Demosthenes, an experienced speaker, said: "While other artistic or technical attainments are
fairly autonomous, the art of the speaker is ruined should the auditors prove recalcitrant.” (“On the Embassy” 340).

This is the kind of close affinity between speaker and auditor that Aristotle recognizes and presents in the *Rhetoric*. Should the speaker overlook the salient features of the ἔθος of his auditors, or dismiss them as insignificant or irrelevant to his purpose, he effectively negates or weakens the force of his own ἔθος as entecnich pistis. In such a relationship the auditors’ ἔθος cannot be anything but an entecnich pistis, for it must be understood and addressed by the speaker to ensure the credibility of his own ἔθος with the auditors. From the evidence of the text statements the impression is received that the speaker’s ἔθος cannot function autonomously and exclusively as a force for establishing conviction in an audience. In fact, it may well be that the more realistic assessment of the speaker-auditor relationship in Aristotle is that the auditors’ ἔθος not only exerts an influence on the speaker’s ἔθος, but also on the emotional resonance (πάθος) he lends to his argument as well as its intellectual temper (λόγος). If any distinction were to be drawn between the speaker’s and the auditors’ ἔθος as entecnich pistis in the *Rhetoric*, one could say that Aristotle gave the speaker’s ἔθος primacy of importance: it is the ἔθος which is mentioned first, the only one formally identified as entecnich pistis, and while it is tempered by the auditors’ ἔθος it is the one which comes into play openly in rhetorical discourse.

By way of conclusion we might ask whether or not Aristotle’s concept of the ἔθος of the speaker and of the auditors as an entecnich source of establishing conviction and assisting proof continued in the subsequent tradition. Our one substantial store of evidence for that would be in the Latin tradition which is a derivative of, and so a witness to, the later Greek tradition. From the *Rhetoric to Herennius*, the rhetorical works of Cicero, the *Dialogus of Tacitus*, and Quintilian’s *Institutio oratoria* the answer would be negative. There may be suggestions of an understanding, but there are no signs of a clear apprehension of a role for the speaker’s and less so the auditor’s ἔθος as a probative force. What is notable is a superb confidence in the ability of the speaker to achieve what he wishes by himself, his style, and his command of rhetorical techniques, the bene dicendi scientia. This impression is actually reflected and borne out in the titles of the various works: *Orator*, *De Oratore*, *Brutus de Claris Oratoribus*, *Institutio Oratoria*, *Education of the Orator*, *Dialogus de Oratoribus*. The speaker’s ἔθος finds expression in Cato’s *vir bonus* who would be for Cicero and Quintilian a well-educated and cultivated man. Apart from that, neither speaks in a formal way of ἔθος, or the comparable Latin term *mores*, to express the character of the speaker—or the audience—as a formal probative method for winning conviction. Cicero does not even use the word ἔθος where he might be expected to do so. It does appear once in his writings in the opening lines of *De Fato* and is explained as the word the Greeks use for *mores* (moral character). ἔθος is not to be found in the Latin tradition in the meaning we find in the *Rhetoric*. We do learn that the speaker must make himself attractive to the audience, and that he does this by the image of himself which he presents “by proclaiming his own merits, etc. . . . by attributing the opposite qualities to the opponents . . . by indicating some hope for agreement with the judges.”

It is not difficult to accept the fact that the Latin tradition (as seen in our four sources) recognized the importance of the speaker as a person, and to a degree, of the auditors, and the contribution each makes toward establishing acceptance of the subject proposed by the speaker. But this recognition is not formalized either as the ἔθος, or the *mores* of each, and developed as a form of winning conviction in the same way that reason and emotion are. In the *Rhetoric to Herennius* 1.4.7-8 we meet the typical acknowledgment of the need for a receptive audience. At 3.6.11 we find an awareness of the role of speaker and audience: “Principium sumitur aut ab nostra . . . aut ab eorum qui audient persona.” At Cicero’s *Orator* 8.24 we read of the auditors: “Semper oratorum eloquentiae moderratrix fuit auditorum prudentia” (Brutus 51.191-192 and cp. 184; *De Inventione* 1.16.22; *De Oratore* 2.79.321.)

Yet when we turn to the remarks of Cicero and Quintilian on what Cicero says the Greeks called ἔθος and Quintilian that they called ἔθος, we do not find the remarks relevant to Aristotle’s entecnich pistis ἔθος. Cicero’s comment is at *Orator* 37.128. At first eye-catching, it shortly dissipates whatever it seemed to promise: “Dueae res sunt enim quae . . . admirabilem eloquentiam faciant. Quorum alterum
of the speaker’s ἐθνὸς as an emotion, he is speaking inescapably about an emotional response aroused in the audience by the speaker as a person, by his lenitas, humanitas, and his “style of speaking which is adapted to his vita and mores” (2.53.212-213). For Aristotle, however, an emotional response is won by the entechnic pistis πάθος.

Quintilian, in his discussion of ἐθνὸς (6.2.2-20), is not much clearer than Cicero. After stating that ἐθνὸς is an emotion and the kind of emotion it is, Quintilian on occasion draws confusingly close to Aristotle’s view of ἐθνὸς but the observations never sharpen or stay in focus. At 6.2.13 the word denotes goodness, integrity, or genuineness in the speaker, and then drifts off in another direction. At 17 it is moral character (mores) that should be found in a speech when the talk is of moral character. At 18 it means that the speaker be a vir bonus, but by 20 we are back with the idea of emotion.

Fundamentally Quintilian and Cicero, when speaking of the effect of the speaker as a person (his ἐθνὸς) on the auditors, are speaking of an emotional effect upon the audience. This is not the response to the speaker’s ἐθνὸς in Aristotle. There the response of the auditors is to the credential quality of the speaker (1356a5-8, 1377b25-28); it is a response which is more intellectual than it is emotional. Roth (1866, p. 856) puts it well: “The speaker’s ἐθνὸς is the prominent disposition in his personality and his style which responds to the understanding of his hearers.”

What emerges from this brief survey of the later rhetorical tradition as seen in treatises on rhetoric by Quintilian, Cicero, Tacitus, and the Ad Herennium is that the Aristotelian concept of ἐθνὸς as entechnic pistis, whether it be that of the speaker or of the speaker and auditor, is not present. It has been lost somewhere along the way, and perhaps early on. What we find is the presence of the orator as the dominant and controlling factor in discourse. The auditors are effectively in his hands to dispose of as he will. In fact, comments throughout the works on the emotions and the way they have been or may be used reinforce this view. Those cited at n.3 are not untypical.

What has also accompanied the disappearance of Aristotelian ἐθνὸς as entechnic pistis is Aristotle’s sense of the importance of the auditors. His clear understanding of the auditors as cooperative, and in some
ways codeterminative, participants in discourse is not really the perception of the auditors we now find. Aristotle's emphasis at the outset (1.3) on the auditors as the ultimate objective of rhetorical discourse in their role as judges and their study of the emotions to which they are subject, as well as their varied types are not met as part of the formal theory of later rhetoricians.

NOTES

1. Another facet of this concern of Aristotle for the auditors' participation in discourse is seen in the matter of logical pistis (logos). The speaker's argumentation should be such that it is not so brief as to confuse, nor so detailed in stating the obvious as to bore, but should challenge the audience in its very first enunciation. This is first suggested at 1357a16-21. At 1400b27-34 Aristotle is more explicit, saying in part: "All such refutative and demonstrative syllogisms which the auditors foresee as soon as they are stated—and not because they are superficial—are particularly applauded, for at one and the same time (i.e., as they hear the argument) the auditors are delighted with themselves as they anticipate its conclusion; further, all those enthymemes are applauded which the auditors are slightly behind in apprehending only to the extent that they apprehend them when they have been completed." At 1410b21-27 Aristotle first notes that the auditors do not care for reasonings that are obvious and which call for no effort. He then remarks: "All those enthymemes are highly esteemed which either are understood as soon as they are stated particularly if the knowledge is new (not on hand before), or those which the mind is a step behind in grasping." The kind of attention Aristotle apparently wants from his auditors in the matter of argumentation is that of which he speaks (1412a20-21) in describing the auditor's response to a good metaphor: "How true! And I failed to see it!"

In Grimaldi (pp. 87-91) there is a brief word on Aristotle's insistence that the audience obtain a quick and understanding grasp of the speaker's reasoning.

2. See also 1355a21-24 and Aristotle's argument for the art of rhetoric on the grounds that it serves truth and justice. In Cicero one can be disconcerted at times by the strong references to the emotions. At Brutus 279 we read that an orator's "highest praise" is to "inflame the emotions of the auditors and bend them to follow along whatever way the subject demands." At 89 we come upon this: "the speaker who inflames the auditor (indicem) accomplishes far more than the one who instructs him."

3. See, however, 1356a13 on the preeminence of the speaker's θέους as pistis (χριστιατικος), with which compare Isocrates ("Antidosis," 278-280); on the other hand see 1366a13-14 on the θέους of the politeia as a moral person and as something that is definitely not the speaker, but which he calls the most susative πιθανοτητον.

4. From the passage cited Aristotle is speaking of moral virtues, which at 1106a11-12 he identifies with the hexeis and specifically at 1106b36f with the hexeis prohairesetikai, the elective habits or habits of purposeful choosing. Such habits are equated with the presence of θέους (1366a14-16, 1395b14-17, 1417a16-19). Thus moral virtue is in our passage equated with θέους. In fact at the end of the discussion we read (1138a3f): "In our analysis of the virtues of the soul we noted that some are virtues of character (θέους), some of the intellects. We have, therefore, completed the virtues of character (θέους)." So, we cannot confuse θέους with pathos.

5. Here attention might be called to 1369a13-31 where Aristotle speaks of the influence of θέους in the actions of men and so the need to know the θέους in order to know how and why men might act. Once again we see that by itself the speaker's θέους as an entechnic pistis will be relatively ineffective unless it is able to utilize the resources of the auditor's θέους.

6. Aristotle (1356a20-27) explicitly remarks that to use the three entechnic pistes correctly, we must among other things make a study of types of human character, a study found in the discipline of Ethics, ἦν μετὰ τῆς θεοφανετῆς, which is primarily a study of moral virtue and the moral life.

7. See, also, EN 1103a17-18, EE 1220a39-b1.

8. Aristotle expresses this notion at the outset of the Rhetoric, 1354a7: "because of the habitude derived from a stable disposition."

9. 1366a14-16, 1369a15-19, 28-29; 1389a35-37; 1390a16, 17-18; 1395b14-18; 1414a21-22; 1417a17, 18, 19-20, 22, 23-24; 1418a16-17, b23.

10. In the analysis of the different kinds of character in II.12-17 there are constant references to moral character, that is, the virtues and vices as they are found in EN 1107a28-1108b10, EE 1220b38-1221a12. In describing the characters he speaks of courage, temperance, liberality (and so on) and self-indulgence, frugality, meanness, cowardice (and so on).

11. The habits of θέους as entechnic pistes to signify the moral character of both speaker and auditor and the mutual influence of each upon the other makes much sense. It explains, for instance, a number of statements in the text on the θέους of each and also explains in a simple way the development between II.4 and II.17. With the introduction of the three entechnic pistes at I.2 Aristotle develops the idea by illustrating each pistis between I.2 and II.17; reason (logos) at I.4-14; emotion (pathos) at II.2-11; moral character (ethos) at II.12-17.

12. As Burnett (p. 66) remarks, it was the formation of this kind of θέους that was the object of the first edition in the Republic and Laws of Plato.

13. See Aristotle for the uses. The word θέους appears 12 times (in the singular 7 times, in the plural 5) and θεοκτών once. In a number of instances there is obvious reference to θέους as entechnic pistes.

14. Anaximenes' meaning for the word θέους is similar to Aristotle's, that is, the way a person habitually acts (1428b11) in the area of moral activity (see, for example, the actions he mentions). He employs the word 10 times in the following manner: referring to the speaker twice (1430a28-29; 1446a14; possibly 1445b17); in one instance to the auditors (1434b28-31); in three instances it refers to others and their habitual ways of acting (1429a11; 1430a35; 1441b19-20) and in two instances akin to this it could be taken in the same way, or as "moral character" (1445b3, 12); in one case (1441b22) the meaning is unclear.

15. If we think of the θέους of the speaker as the sole entechnic pistis we are forced at passages such as II.1 (1377b22-28) to ask how a speaker can develop the auditor's character without an intelligent knowledge of what probably makes it tick. Or again at 1377b28-1378a6 one wonders how he can make the auditors well-disposed, in fact dispose them at all without such knowledge. Such an effort sounds unpleasantly like the remarks of Gorgias in Plato ("Gorgias," 458e-460e).
16. *De Partitio Oratoria* 8.28. This idea reappears often in the formulaic expression “that we win over the auditors to ourselves” (*De Oratore*, 2.27.115). But as is seen from the citation this is done in other ways than by what the speaker himself is as a person. Enos and McClaran, however, in their study of the speakers and audience in Cicero’s works (including the nonrhetorical) present a different reading of their place in Latin tradition. So, too, does Fantham in her study of the Ciceronian idea of what Aristotle calls the speaker’s ὥτας. In the course of it she indicates that Cicero may also have in mind the ὥτας of others. There is a problem, however, as will be seen in the meaning of ὥτας in the Latin tradition. This cannot be resolved by interpreting *Rhetoric* 11.12-17, as Fantham does (p. 270), as a continuation of “the analysis of the emotions in the audience.” In this view she is not alone (e.g., Süss, p. 163). However, it overlooks two facts: Aristotle denies that ὥτας is σόφως; in Aristotle’s concept of ὥτας the emotions enter in as a part. As was said earlier an ὥτας for Aristotle is a firm disposition in a person formed partly under the direction of reason with respect to that part of the appetitive soul represented by the emotions and reflecting the quality of the person’s dominant habits in the sphere of moral activity.

17. “The introduction is drawn from the person of the speaker . . . or from that of the prospective auditors”; see also Cicero (*Orator*, 25, 123): “The speaker should make the greatest use of this kind of discretion—that he be a controlling influence with respect to occasions and persons.”

18. The practical good sense of the auditors has always been a guide for the eloquence of speakers.”

19. In fact this pistis is understood to be a form of σόφως; see, for example, Martin (pp. 97, 158-160), Kroll (p. 69) and Roth (pp. 855, 858).

20. “There are, to be sure, two factors which make one’s eloquence worthy of wonder. One of them is what the Greeks call ‘expressive of moral character’ and is conformed to the natures of men, their moral conduct, and all the customary ways of life; the other is what they term ‘emotive.’ ”


22. At times even passing comments (objectively quite correct) emphasize the importance of the speaker and convey the idea that if he uses his wits he can have his way, for example, speaking on “propriety” at *Orator* 72, Cicero says: “Although a word (verbum) without reference to the thing it denotes possesses no power at all, still time and again that same thing is accepted or rejected if it is expressed in one way or another (aliaque atque alio verbo).”

REFERENCES


