Probabilities, Signs, Necessary Signs, Idia, and Topoi: The Confusing Discussion of Materials for Enthymemes in the *Rhetoric*

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This essay examines three groups of “sources” or “materials” of enthymemes in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. According to the text of the *Rhetoric*, enthymemes are derived from, among other things, probabilities, signs, and necessary signs, and/or from the topics, and/or from idia as the following table indicates.¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topoi as materials from which enthymemes are said</th>
<th>Probabilities, signs, and necessary signs as the materials from which enthymemes are said</th>
<th>Idia as materials from which enthymemes are said</th>
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<tr>
<td>I mean by dialectical and rhetorical sullogismous those which are concerned with what we call <em>tous topous</em>, which may be applied alike to law, physics, politics, and many other sciences (1358a10–11; cf. 1358a26–29).</td>
<td>Enthymemes are said from probabilities (<em>eikōn</em>) and signs (<em>sēmeiōn</em>) (1357a32–33; cf. 1402b12–14). For necessary signs, and probabilities and signs are rhetorical propositions (<em>protaseis eisi rhētōrikai</em>) (1359a6–9).</td>
<td>The majority of enthymemes are from these specifics (<em>tou̱n tòn eidōn</em>) which are also called peculiar (<em>idiōn</em>), specifically (<em>kata meros</em>); fewer are from the common things (<em>tòn koinó̱n</em>) (1358a27–30).</td>
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The *Rhetoric* does not explain any relationships that may exist between these different sources (or materials) from which enthymemes are said. This problem, as I am framing it, is two-fold: First, these different conceptions of materials from which enthymemes are said are never reconciled into a coherent account (or theory) in the *Rhetoric*. Rather, each conception of materials for the enthymeme is presented in a way that obscures, rather than facilitates, our understanding of the materials of enthymemes in the *Rhetoric*. Moreover, when *Rhetoric* 2.22–23 and its textual contexts are compared to 1.2 and its textual contexts, several differences will emerge.
in respect to the nature of the materials of enthymemes and the distinctions in enthymemes that further cloud our understanding of the text. Second, many contemporary commentators place more emphasis on the dialectical aspects of rhetoric than the demonstrative. For while rhetoric is said to be closely related to dialektik in important ways in the early portions of the Rhetoric (especially 1.1–2), there are, arguably, more similarities between the materials of enthymemes in the Prior and Posterior Analytics (and thus demonstrative argument) than in the Topics (and dialectical argument). This suggests that the discussion of the materials of enthymemes in the Rhetoric is more demonstrative in nature (or at least in emphasis) than dialectical, and I hope to demonstrate that this is the case.

As far as I can tell, Grimaldi’s discussions of the “Eikota and semeia” (1972, 104–15) and “The topoi” (115–35) are the only contemporary attempts to explicitly address the relationship between probabilities and signs and the topoi in the Rhetoric. Grimaldi’s account is confusing in many respects. For example, in addition to understanding the idia as topoi, he claims that “[w]hen Aristotle has presented us with the sources of the enthymeme, eikota and semeia, and told us that they are the premises of enthymematic reasoning (A3, 59a7–10) the question which immediately arises is where does the rhetor turn for the material which will provide him with such eikota and semeia. The answer is: the topics” (115). Yet, a little further down the same page, he claims that “the topics are sources, or loci, both particular and general, to which one must have recourse in constructing probable argumentation by enthymeme in an effort to effect pistis” (115). So, in effect, Grimaldi claims that probabilities and signs are the sources of enthymemes and then that the topoi are the sources of probabilities and signs, but, as demonstrated above, the text of the Rhetoric clearly claims that the topoi are the sources of enthymemes just as probabilities, signs, and necessary signs are sources of enthymemes. Grimaldi fails to address or even acknowledge this. Rather, in his attempt to maintain the unity of the text of the Rhetoric, he has advanced this working relationship between eikota and semeia and the topoi in what he claims is a consistent theory in the Rhetoric concerning the relationship of eikota and semeia (and tekmeira) to the topoi that, I will argue, is not supported by the text as Grimaldi suggests. More recently, Robin Smith (1989 and 1997) provides carefully informed commentary on some of these terms—topos, idia, eikos, semeia, and tekmeira—but, and this is not his purpose, he does not provide a discussion that explicitly examines how (or if) these different terms relate to one another as sources of enthymemes. Thus, this essay is an attempt to explore and succinctly articulate the problems with the discussion of mate-
rials of enthymemes in the *Rhetoric*. As I will attempt to demonstrate, the discussion of the materials of enthymemes, as presented in the *Rhetoric*, is plagued with serious difficulties. Many, if not most, of these difficulties have not been addressed by contemporary commentators of the *Rhetoric*. I will argue that the traditional reading of the *Rhetoric* that understands a unified discussion of the materials or sources of enthymemes simplifies and distorts in important ways the confusing discussion within the text. In addition, there are significant differences concerning the concepts of *signs, necessary signs, probabilities, idia*, and *topoi* that are not distinguished in the text. These differences in conception are elaborated upon in other Aristotelian works and are important to understanding the discussion of the different materials of enthymemes in the *Rhetoric*. Moreover, it is the disjointed discussion in the *Rhetoric* itself concerning the materials from which enthymemes are said that is to blame for these problems in understanding the materials of enthymemes. In my concluding remarks, I will offer what I think is a viable solution that satisfactorily explains the confusing discussion in the text.

There are many possible ways to approach this discussion. Because the different terms to be considered—*eikota, idia, sēmeia, tekmeria*, and *topos*—are primarily confined to two passages in the *Rhetoric* (1.2 and 2.22–5), I will examine these passages and contexts separately, after a few preliminary comments concerning the term *topos*. And, rather than examining carefully how the *topoi* in the *Rhetoric* relate to or are different from the *topoi* in the *Topics*, I am more interested in understanding how (or if) the different conceptions of *probabilities, signs, necessary signs, idia*, and *topoi* relate to one another as materials from which enthymemes are said. So while I will briefly consider different views of what a *topos* is, I will spend more time attempting to relate the *topoi* to *probabilities, signs, necessary signs*, and the *idia* as sources of enthymemes than explain how the *topoi* work in the *Rhetoric*.

**Topos**

As far as we can tell, the term *topos* as it is understood in the technical Aristotelian sense, was not in common usage prior to the Aristotelian texts. There is no hint of the Aristotelian usage of the term in Plato. Isocrates does, however, use *topos* as the substance or material concerning a subject under consideration on two occasions. At *Helen* 4, Isocrates complains that
men like Zeno and Gorgias have demonstrated that it is “easy to contrive false statements on any subject that may be proposed,” but they “still waste time on this subject” (eti peri ton topon touton diatribousin), the antecedent of which seems to be a reference to Melissus’ claim that all is one. Isocrates’ second usage is at Panathenaicus 111 where he criticizes unskilled speakers who are unable to refute the subjects (tous topos) he has already addressed. Aside from these two uses of topos that share some similarity with the Aristotelian usage, the term does not appear to have been used in the technical Aristotelian sense prior to its use in the Topics and Rhetoric. Rather, the Aristotelian usage seems (from our textual perspective anyway) to have exploded onto the scene ex nihilo with little to no explanation as to the nature of its origin. But, as the term is used in the Topics, we are also led to understand that the practitioners of dialectic and, because of its relationship to dialectic, rhetoric are already very familiar with what a topos is. There is a problem with such a scenario though. For, while dialectic, as it is used in the Topics and Rhetoric, is not defined, which leads to the assumption that the dialectical practitioners already know what dialectic and its parts (including the topoi) are (Smith 1997, xii), topos is defined in the Rhetoric, which, using the same reasoning, would suggest that topos is (or was at that time) a new concept therein. This problem aside, I will address the Aristotelian definitions of topos.

Although there are hundreds of examples of topos in the Topics and many less in the Rhetoric, the only passages that attempt to offer definitions of a topos are Rhetoric 1.2.21 and 1.2.22 (1358a12 and 1358a32) and 2.22 (1396b20–22 and 1403a17–19). The first two passages (1.2.21 and 1.2.22) emphasize that the topoi are “in common” with other fields and are distinguished from the idia (contra Grimaldi, Kennedy, and Slomkowski), and the second two definitions emphasize that the topoi are stoicheia or elements of enthymemes as the following table indicates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rhetoric 1.2.21 (1358a10–12)</th>
<th>Rhetoric 1.2.22 (1358a31–32)</th>
<th>Rhetoric 1396b20</th>
<th>Rhetoric 1403a17–19</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>I say that dialectical and rhetorical deductions are concerned with those things which we are calling topics; these are those in common concerning laws, physics, and concerning politics and concerning many different species, such as the topic of the more and the less.</td>
<td>I say the specifics (eide) are the peculiar (idia) protaseis according to each class / kind (genos), but the topics (topous) are the common (tous koinous) [protatseis] similar of all things.</td>
<td>One method of selection—this the first—[is] the topical, but we call the element of enthymemes; but I say the element and the topic of the enthymeme is the same thing.</td>
<td>To amplify and diminish are not an element of enthymeme; for I say an element and topic are the same, for element and topic are that into which many enthymemes fall [or, meet].</td>
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In the following discussion, I will examine the contexts of these two definitions of *topos* and suggest that there are some possible important differences (and surely some degrees of difference) between them. Because the definition of *topos* in 2.22 has received more attention than that in 1.2, I will begin with it.

The context of the definition of topos at 2.22–23

Beginning at 2.20, we are told that all that remains is a discussion of the *common proofs* (*tēn koīnōn pistēōn*), which are of two kinds: example (*paradeigma*) and enthymeme. The example, which is a kind of induction, includes two kinds: fable and fact. Fables are more suitable for public speeches (*dēmēgorikoi*) and facts are better for deliberating (1394a2ff). We are told that the example can be used as a demonstration, but that induction (*epagōgē*) is not suitable (*ouk oikeion*) to rhetorical speeches except on very few occasions (1394a15).

After a lengthy discussion of how maxims are part of enthymemes (2.21), we are told at the beginning of Chapter 22 (1395b20) that a general (*katholou*) discussion of the enthymeme will ensue, and, more specifically, that it is necessary to investigate what method should be sought (*tina tropon dei zētein*, 1395b21) concerning, first, the enthymeme, and then, the *topics*. By way of introduction to this discussion, we are told that whether it is political or any other kind of reasoning (*eite politikō sullogismō eith' hupoiōdoun*), it is necessary to be acquainted with the present circumstances or facts (*huparchonta*) concerning the issue at hand, either completely or in part, for without these, one would not be able to draw conclusions (*exois sunagein*) (1396a3–7). This practice of knowing the substance (*huparchonta*) of the subject matter is what all men do while demonstrating (*apodeiknuntes*) because they do not derive their arguments from indiscriminate things, but from what is inherent (*huparchonta*) in each particular subject because it is impossible to prove anything in any other way, as, we are told, has been stated in the *Topics* (1396b1–4).

This interlude aside, one method (*tropos*) of selection is advanced—the topical (*ho topikos*); that is, the author is now going to speak “of the elements [*stoicheia*] of enthymemes (by element [*stoicheion*] and topic of enthymeme, I mean the same thing)” (1396b20–22). Thus, we have one definition (of sorts) of a *topos*. However, before we get to the discussion of these topics (or elements), there is another digression concerning the two
types of enthymemes, the demonstrative (deiktika) and the refutative (elegktika) (2.22.14–17, 1396b15–1397a6). The demonstrative enthymeme draws its conclusions from those which are admitted or agreed (ek homologoumenon), whereas the refutative enthymeme draws its conclusions from those which are not admitted or inconsistent (anomologoumena).

After acknowledging that the topoi are known more or less concerning each of the useful and necessary species or kinds (eidon) and that the propositions have been selected concerning characters, emotions, and habits, another general method concerning all things (allon tropon katholou peri apanton) is going to be considered while, noting in passing, speaking about demonstrative, refutative, and apparent enthymemes. Finally, we begin, with the onset of Chapter 23, with the discussion of the topoi: “one topic of demonstrative [enthymemes] is from opposites” (esti de heis men topos ton deiktikon ek ton enantion) (1397a7), and the discussion concerning the topics is underway.

This preceding passage (2.20–22, 1393a22–1397a6) is both a rich and complicated portion of the text, and while careful consideration of the entire passage is beyond the scope of this essay, there are three points within the passage that are pertinent to my interest in understanding the rhetorical topics that I will discuss at some length before comparing this passage to 1.2. These are (1) the emphasis upon demonstration in the passage, (2) en tois topikois, and (3) the definition of the topos as a stoicheon.

The emphasis upon demonstration in Rhetoric 2.20–22 (1393a22–1397a6)

That demonstration is emphasized in this passage that leads up to the discussion of the traditional common topics is, I hope to show, interesting and puzzling. After the digression on maxims, we are told that the subject of our speech or reasoning, whether it be political or of any other kind, is to be acquainted with the facts (huparchonta) relevant to the field of discussion, either entirely or in part (1396a3–7), for this is what all men follow while demonstrating (apodeiknuntes); that is, while reasoning most accurately or most loosely, they do not take their arguments from all things, but from what is inherent in each particular subject, for it is impossible to prove anything in any other way (1396b1–4, 2.22.10). This emphasis upon specific knowledge of a particular subject matter is not only not considered to be part of either the dialectician’s or rhetorician’s responsibilities, but is,
in the Aristotelian scheme of things, the province of the one who demonstrates. Earlier in *Rhetoric*, we are told that “In so far as anyone attempts to make dialectic or rhetoric not just faculties (*dunameis*) but sciences (*epistēmas*), he will unknowingly destroy their nature by the change, by crossing over into the sciences of certain underlying facts, but not merely of words” (1359b13–16). But the emphasis in this immediate passage (2.22) is on knowing the subject matter of each particular field—the *idia*, an important term to be considered below. We are also told that the most important questions with which deliberation concerns itself—war and peace, security, the economy, and imports and exports—are not the work of the rhetorician, but, rather, that of the Aristotelian conception of the statesman (*politikēs*) (1360a37–38). In sharp contrast, it is the one who demonstrates who deals with specific subjects and who argues from propositions inherent to that specific subject, which is clearly the subject under consideration in this passage we are now examining.

Continuing the discussion of 2.22, we are next told that there are two kinds of enthymemes: the demonstrative and the refutative. The demonstrative enthymeme (*deiktika enthume-ma*) is that which “*is or is not* (*hoti estin e- ouk estin*) and it draws its conclusions (*sunagein*) from those things that are admitted (*ek homologoumenōn*) (1396b24–26). This designation of the demonstrative enthymeme sounds identical to the demonstrative demonstration of the *Posterior Analytics*, where we are told that “every demonstration (*apodeixis*) proves (*deiknusin*) something about something else, such as that *is or is not* (*hoti estin e- ouk estin*) (90b33–34). And, “again, we say that it is by demonstration (*di' apodeixeōs*) necessarily that everything must be proved to exist” (*deiknusthai hapan hoti estin*) (92b12–13; cf. 92a35ff). Moreover, there is one passage in the *Prior Analytics* in which all three of the terms we find in this passage in the *Rhetoric*—*apodeixis*, *deiktike*, and *homologoumenon*—occur: “A demonstration [*hē apodeixis*] <leading> into an impossibility differs from a probative demonstration [*tēs deiktikēs*] in that it puts as a premise what it wants to reject by leading away into an agreed falsehood [*homologoumenon pseudos*], while a probative demonstration begins from agreed positions [*ek homologoumenôn theseōn*]” (Smith 1989, 86). *Deiktikōs* is also used at *Prior Analytics* 29a30–39 where a distinction is made between, as Smith notes, “completing a deduction ‘probatively’ (*deiktikōs*) and completing it through an impossibility” (118). Without getting into the complexities of these passages, my point is that there is at least a close conceptual relationship between Aris-
totelian demonstration in the Prior and Posterior Analytics and the introductory discussion to the common topoi at Rhetoric 2.22.

A final comment concerning demonstration and the topoi is the first line of Chapter 23, “One topos of the demonstrative is from the opposites” (Esti d’ heis men topos tôn deiktikôn ek tôn enantiodón) (1396b20). It seems odd that the first reference to what are traditionally understood to be the common topoi is referred to as a topos of the demonstrative—that is, specific kinds (of enthymemes). Moreover, it seems to me that we are to understand this reference to deiktikôn within the context of the earlier discussion of deiktikôn and apodeixis (2.22) and the similar contexts within the Analytics. There is a difficulty with relating it to the discussion in the Topics, for deiktikos (or deiktikos) does not occur in the Topics at all, but is found on many occasions in the Prior Analytics and once in the Posterior Analytics.17

It is interesting to note how commentators on Rhetoric have addressed this fact. Kennedy suggests that the section in 2.22 that discusses the demonstrative aspects of the enthymeme (14–17, 1396b22–1397a6) is “perhaps a later addition, in which case Aristotle’s decision to refer to idia as topics is a late stage in the development of the Rhetoric” (1991, 189). Kennedy offers no comment concerning the demonstrative topic at 2.23. Like Kennedy, Grimaldi does not discuss deiktikôn at 1397a7 at all. He only explains that “[W]e come now to the general or formal topics in contradistinction to the particular or material topics” (1980, 2.291). Moreover, concerning the passage that emphasizes demonstration that precedes this discussion of the topoi (1396b28–34) that I briefly analyzed above and that Kennedy thinks is a later addition, Grimaldi says only that “[Aristotle] makes a summation here and thus brings to a conclusion of the proposal at A2, 58a 32–35” (2.288) which reads “Most of the enthymemes are from these eidôn which are called idiôn in part, fewer from the common things. Just as in the Topics, even here it is necessary to distinguish from which things the eidê and the topous of enthymemes must be grasped.”18 But, as will be seen below, there are problems with Grimaldi’s account and there are also differences between these passages that Grimaldi fails to consider. An examination of, first, the reference to en topikois in this immediate passage and then a comparison of Rhetoric 2.22 (1396b) to Rhetoric 1.2 (1358) will expose these problems and further support my claim that these discussions are more indebted to the Prior and Posterior Analytics than the Topics.
At 1396b3–3, a portion of the passage discussed above, it is stated that

Since all who demonstrate expound in this way, whether they reason most accurately or most loosely, they do not take [propositions] from all things, but from facts concerning each [subject], and since it is impossible through speech to demonstrate anything in any other way, it is evidently necessary, as in the *topikois*, to have selected concerning each thing concerning those which are probable and those which are most important, and to examine in the same way concerning those things which come about on the spur of the moment, while paying close attention not upon indeterminate things, but upon the facts concerning which the argument is about, wherefore the most important and most closely connected of the matter [*pleista kai eggutata tou pragmatos*].

In locating where this reference to the *Topics* is in the *Topics*, Freese cites 1.14 (Aristotle 1994, 292); Kassel cites 1.14 in general, but 105b13ff more specifically (1976, 123); Kennedy (1991) cites 1.4–15, and in doing so he follows Grimaldi who asserts, “[t]he first book of the *Topics*, chaps. 4–18, give the general method for seeking propositions on a subject. It does so by suggesting ways in which to look at anything to discover its essential and non-essential aspects; it reviews the varied meanings of terms, kinds of possible propositions and ways they would be selected, summing up the process in part at 105b12–18” (1980, 2.285).

While there may be some, albeit remote, similarities between *Rhetoric* 2.22 and *Topics* 1, there are also problems with relating the two. First, while the *Topics* is concerned with finding propositions (*protaseis*), it is concerned with dialectic, not demonstration, which is in sharp contrast to our passage here in *Rhetoric* that is clearly talking about demonstration. Second, the passage in the *Topics* is concerned with finding premises that make use of the accepted opinions (*endoxa*) of others (either of everyone, the majority, the wise, or the most famous). While this is expected within dialectical argument, drawing demonstrations from the opinions of others is not the case in demonstrations and is not at all considered in our passage in the *Rhetoric*. Third, in both the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics* there are not only many general similarities in thought with this passage under consideration in the *Rhetoric,* but also specific examples. *Prior Analytics* 46a11–30 is strikingly similar in thought to *Rhetoric* 2.22. Some similarities include the search for a method (*tropos*) to establish *principles of sullogismoi* (An.) or *elements of enthymemes* (Rhet.), not by considering
everything (An.) and not propositions from all sources but only those that are relevant (Rhet.), an example from astronomy (An.) and from politics (Rhet.), and both are concerned with demonstration and refutation. So while there are clear differences in contexts between Rhetoric 2.22 and Prior Analytics 46, there are also striking conceptual and lexical similarities between these passages that, it could be argued, are closer than any parallels in the Topics. A comparison of this passage in Rhetoric 2.22 to Rhetoric 1.2 will further support this contention, but first a few comments about the definition of a topos in 2.22 are necessary.

Topos as an “element” [stoicheia]

Rhetoric 1396b21–22 and its parallel passage at 1403a17–19 (2.26.1) are typically cited as the Aristotelian definition of a topos, “Let us speak about the elements [ta stoicheia] of enthymemes; (I call an element and a topos of the enthymeme the same thing)” and “I call element [stoicheion] and topos the same thing; for the element and topos is that unto which many enthymemes fall [empiptei]).” Slomkowski (1997, 63) and Smith (1997, xxiv–v) both supplement this definition with Theophrastus’ definition as recorded by Alexander of Aphrodisias in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Topoi:

For the topic, as Theophrastus says, ‘is a starting-point or element [stoicheion] from which we take the starting-points concerning each matter by focusing our thought upon it. It is delimited in compass—for either it includes those common and universal things which are the principal ingredients of syllogisms, or these are at least capable of being proved and obtained from them—but unlimited as to the number of individual instances which come under it.’ (2001, 7)

As Van Ophuijsen notes, this definition of a topos by Theophrastus is not as “notoriously loose” as Aristotle’s definitions in the Rhetoric (141 n. 102), but it is still vaguer than we’d like. Smith, supplementing Aristotle’s definition with Theophrastus’ “cryptic” definition, suggests that “at the core of a topos” there is an “argument form: an abstract or schematic statement of a conclusion-form and corresponding premise-forms from which it follows. However, the topos itself is not just this form, but this form embedded in procedures for its use as part of Aristotle’s dialectical method.” He care-
fully illustrates how the topoi of 2.23 and the Topics can be understood as both a location for arguments and “an abstract or schematic statement of a conclusion-form and corresponding premise-forms from which it follows” (1997, xxvi). Using the topic of contraries, he explains that this argument form takes the following shape:

If the contrary of Contrary A belongs to the contrary of Contrary B,
then Contrary A belongs to Contrary B.

An example of this is:

If harmful belongs to bad, then beneficial belongs to good.

Smith explains that the consequent of this conditional sentence (beneficial belongs to the good) would be the desired conclusion in a dialectical encounter. This could then be put into a premise/conclusion form:

Harmful belongs to bad.
Therefore, beneficial belongs to good.

Finally, the original condition could be accepted as the premise of the argument and we get the following sullogismos:

If harmful belongs to bad, then beneficial belongs to good.
Harmful belongs to bad.
Therefore, beneficial belongs to good.

(Adapted from Smith 1997, xxv–xxvi)

Thus, the premise-conclusion argument form.

Slomkowski, on the other hand, understands the topos as stoicheion as a principle. Beginning with Topics 163b22–33 where the dialectical practitioner is exhorted to commit a common protaseis (protasin te koinēn) to memory rather than an entire argument, he builds a case that these common protaseis are common principles. Slomkowski’s argument takes the following form: the enthymeme that is derived from the topos of, say, contraries is a one premise-one conclusion argument such as “Self control is good, for lack of self-control is harmful” (1997, 44). The topos of contrary and the other topoi are common protaseis and these are synonymous with the stoicheion and the stoicheion “is often synonymously used with ‘prin-
principle’ (arché), [which] leads one to believe that a topos is some sort of principle” (49). By principle, Slomkowski claims that the common topoi are in some way synonymous with the common principles such as non-contradiction, the excluded middle, and equals from equals are equals (49, 103–5), and he cites three topoi in the Topics that, he claims, reflect this (7.6, 112a24–31, 7.7, 113a20–23, and 7.1, 152b11–15).

In summarizing, I have argued that the emphasis upon demonstration in the passage leading up to a discussion of the topics in Rhetoric 2 parallels conceptual and lexical similarities with the Aristotelian notion of demonstration in the Prior and Posterior Analytics. I have also considered different understandings of the topoi—as locations for arguments and as premise-conclusion forms of argument (Smith) and as common principles similar to the common principles of non-contradiction and the excluded middle (Slomkowski). While I have not in any way attempted to present an in-depth discussion of what the topoi are or how they are used in Rhetoric,21 an examination of the ta koina (the common things/principles) and ta koina’s relationship to the topoi of 1.2 and 2.23 and how they are distinguished from the idia will help us better understand what relationship (if any) the topoi have to the idia and probabilities, signs, and necessary signs as materials from which enthymemes are said.

**Rhetoric 1.2, within its textual context**

Beginning at 1.2.14 (1357a3), we are told that it is clear that most enthymemes are said from general things (epi to polu) and some from necessary things (anaykaia), and that probability (eikos) and sign (sémeion) correlate to general and necessity in that probability (eikos) is the general and sign (sémeion) is the necessary. More specifically, a sémeion is a refutable sign, and a tekmerion is an irrefutable sign—something which has been proved and concluded (dedeigmenon kai peperasmon) (1357b8–9). After these proofs which are thought to be demonstrative (ai dokousai einai pisteis apodeiktikai)—eikos, sémeion, and tekmerion (in contradistinction to the common proofs: example and enthymeme of 2.20) have been stated (1358a1–2) and after a textually corrupt transition,22 we are told (1.2.21, 1358a10ff) that dialectical and rhetorical deductions (sullogismous) are concerned with those things that are called the toupous. These topics, like the more and the less, are in common (koinê23) concerning different sciences. Idia, on the
other hand, are from propositions concerning each species (eidos) and genus (genos), such as propositions about physics that cannot be used in ethics. Those in common (koinē) will not make one intelligent/sensible/prudent (emphrona) concerning any subject, but, in respect to the peculiar (idia), inasmuch as one better (beltion) chooses premises, he will have created a knowledge different from dialectic and rhetoric. Moreover, if, while using these “better premises,” one should come across the first principles (archai) of a science, he will no longer be doing dialectic or rhetoric, but the science of that field in which he came upon the first principles. Most enthymemes are from these particulars (toutōn tôn eidōn), which are called peculiarities, specifically (tōn kata meros kai idiōn) and fewer from the common things (tōn koinōn). Just as in the Topics (en tois topikois), it is necessary to distinguish the specifics (eidē) and the topics (topous) from which enthymemes are grasped. This passage closes with a definition of eidē as “the peculiar propositions [idia protaseis] according to each class [genos]” and a definition of topos as “those similarly common [tous koinous] of all things” (1358a31–32).

Like the passage at 2.20–22, this is a compact and complicated section of the Rhetoric, and I will focus only upon three concepts from the passage that are most pertinent to my discussion:

(1) eikos, sēmeion, and tekmeirion,
(2) the terms topous, koinē (-os), idia, and eidos, and
(3) en tois topikois.

Because the terms topous, koinē, idia, and eidos in this passage are intrinsically linked to the statement that the distinction between eidē enthymemes and topous enthymemes was explained in the Topics (en tois topikois), I will unravel this cluster of terms before discussing eikos, sēmeion, and tekmeirion.

Idia/Eidē/Koinos

In contrast to the passage in 2.22 where enthymemes were distinguished as either demonstrative (deiktika) or refutative (elegktika), in 1.2 enthymemes are distinguished as being either specific (eidē)/peculiar (idia) or topics (topous). Enthymemes from eidē seem to be synonymous with enthymemes
from *idia*. *Idia*, which are *peculiar* to each science, are not said to be *topoi*, but distinguished from the *topous* enthymemes which are said to be *in common* (*koinē*), just as they were distinguished in the *Topics*. Even though neither *idia* nor *eidos* nor *koinē* are used in the *Topics* in any way similar to their (technical) use in the *Rhetoric*, and even though most commentators acknowledge that this distinction is not in the *Topics*, commentators still attempt to find a passage in the *Topics* to which this passage relates. Freese claims that the citation is to *Sophistical Refutations* 9 (Aristotle 1994, 31); Grimaldi, even after acknowledging that the distinction is “certainly not present in the work” (1980, 1.76), proffers 105b12–18 as a passage that is “illustrative of the process of particular and general topics at work in the treatise” (1.76). Kennedy avoids the problem by completely mistranslating the passage. Instead of translating the passage as “Just as also in the *Topics*, so here . . .,” he translates it as “Just as in the case of *topoi* [en tois topikois], so also in the case of enthymemes, a distinction should be made between the species and the *topoi* from which they are to be taken” without any comment as to why he does so (1991, 47). In contrast to these attempts to explain the passage in terms of the *Topics*, I suggest that there are similar discussions in the *Prior and Posterior Analytics* that both parallel this passage and that will possibly help us understand what is going on in *Rhetoric* 1.2.

In the *Prior Analytics*, for example, there are several references to *idia* that parallel its use in the *Rhetoric*. *Idia* are said to be *peculiar* to their subject (43b1–8 and 43b27–29), and in the discussion of selecting the premises that I discussed above, we are told that “the majority of principles for each science are peculiar to it [idiat de kath’ hekastēn eisin ai pleistai]” (46a17ff). There is, however, no distinction between *idia* and *koinē*(-os) in the *Prior Analytics* as all of the latter’s occurrences mean only “common” and convey nothing like the term’s traditional sense in *Rhetoric*. But, there are several passages in the *Posterior Analytics* that distinguish *idia* and *koina* and that also suggest that *idia* are also first principles. For example, at 1.10 we are told that “Of first principles used in the demonstrative sciences, some are *peculiar* (*ta idia*) of each science, and some are *common* (*ta koina*), but the *common* according to analogy, since they are useful in the genus under each science (76a37). Examples of the *idia* are a ‘straight line’ or ‘straightness,’ whereas an example of the *common* is ‘such as when equals are taken from equals the remainders are equal.’ The passage continues that the *idia* [of each field] are simply assumed or accepted, but are proved from the *common* [principles] (*tōn koinōn*)” (cf. 77a26–30 and 76b12ff). Later in the *Posterior Analytics*, *idia* and *koina* are again distin-
guished. We are told that “first principles (archai) are of two kinds: the idia are the genus with which demonstration is concerned and the koina are the things from which demonstrations are derived (88b28; cf Rhetoric 1358a14ff). It is possibly in this sense that the koina are the common axioms [ta koina axiōmata]—one of the three integral elements of a demonstrative science from which (ek hōn) demonstrations are proved (76b12ff).

Just exactly what these common things (ta koina) are and their value in the Aristotelian corpus is a subject of debate. If, for example, the common axioms of Posterior Analytics 76b12 are the same thing as the axioms of 72a17 (as most agree they are), then a common axiom is that which must be grasped if anything whatsoever is to be learned. Moreover, in the Metaphysics, we are told that demonstrative [apodeiktikas] means “the common opinions” [tas koinas doxas] from which all things are proved, such as the law of the excluded middle (that everything must be either affirmed or denied, cf. Aristotle 1997, 77a30) and the law of non-contradiction (that it is impossible at once for something to both be and not be in the same sense at the same time) (1.3.11, 996b26ff). Thus, the common things (ta koina) are what are understood to be commonly understood and commonly known principles that are applicable to any field of inquiry such as the law of non-contradiction, the law of the excluded middle, and that when equals are subtracted from equals then that which remains are equals. In one sense, these common principles are necessary for understanding anything (72).

Yet, in another sense, arguments from general or common principles are said to be too general and empty to be useful. The passage from Rhetoric 1.2 cited above (1358a21–22) claims that knowledge of the common things will not make one prudent about any subject. Sophistical Refutations 11 seems to disparage the study of the common principles (ta koina) in comparison to the study of those things peculiar to a subject (both idia and kata to pragma, 171b4ff.). In the Generation of Animals, a possible argument as to the nature of the offspring of mules is said to be “too general and empty” (katholou lian kai kenos) because arguments that are not proper to the subject under consideration are empty in that they appear to concern themselves with the issue at hand, but, in reality, they are not (748a8).

So while there is a distinction made between the idia and the ta koina within the Aristotelian corpus, and while the distinction made between idia and those things in common in Rhetoric 1.2 seems to need to be read within these broader distinctions, it is not at all clear how (or if) the topoi in common in Rhetoric 1.2 relate to these common principles or the value that these topoi in common have within the Aristotelian scheme of things. There
seems to be important conceptual differences between, on the one hand, the principles of non-contradiction and the excluded middle and, on the other, the premise-conclusion forms of the topoi. And, while Slomkowski was able to find what he thinks is one example of each of the common principles within the Topics that he argues demonstrates that the topoi are common principles in premise-conclusion form, I think that the connections that he attempts to make are strained. And, to base his claim upon these strained connections alone seems tenuous at best. Moreover, if the topoi are common principles in the sense that the common axioms are common principles, then it would be necessary to have an understanding of the topoi “if anything whatsoever is to be learned,” but this does not seem to be the purpose of the topoi in either the Topics or the Rhetoric. Another difficulty is understanding the role or value of the topoi in common because of the ambivalence of their value in the Aristotelian texts. Further examination of this problem is far beyond the scope of this essay, but it is important to note that there seems to be evidence that suggests that utilization of the common topoi in conjunction with fields of study that the Athenian rhetor would find himself discussing—war and peace, deliberation, imports and exports, and defense of the country—would be, in the Aristotelian scheme of things, empty.

Probabilities, Signs, and Necessary Signs

The final grouping of materials from which enthymemes are said is probabilities, signs, and necessary signs. On four different occasions in the Rhetoric, these are explicitly said to be the materials of enthymemes—that is, “for the tekmeria and the probabilities and the signs are rhetorical premises” (1359a7–8) and “Enthymemes are said from probabilities and signs” (1357a32–33, cf. 1359a6–9 and 1402b12–14). These are also said to be demonstrative proofs (1358a1–2) in contrast to the common proofs [tòn koinôn pisteôn] of 2.20 (1393a22–24). These terms were in wide usage by the rhetors and Plato, and their use in the anonymous Rhetorica Ad Alexandrum closely parallels their use in Rhetoric. For my purposes, though, I am more interested in understanding the Aristotelian usage of these terms and how (or if) these terms relate to the other materials of enthymemes—idia and topoi. Thus, I will briefly examine how these terms are used in Rhetoric and Prior Analytics.
Early in *Rhetoric*, we are told that there is a distinction between general and necessary materials from which enthymemes are said (1.2, 1357a22ff). The probability (eikos) is that which generally happens (1.2.15, 1357a34ff). This definition is expanded on in the *Prior Analytics* in that it is an acceptable premise (protasis endoxos)—one that people know happens or does not happen, for the most part. Examples of a probability include such statements as “people hate those who they envy” and “people show affection for the ones they love” (70a3–6). When it comes to signs, they are distinguished between the non-necessary signs (sēmeion), which are refutable, and the necessary (tekmerion) signs, which are not refutable. In the *Rhetoric*, the non-necessary sign relates the particular to the universal, such as to claim that all wise men are just because Socrates was both wise and just (1.2.18, 1357b10–13). In contrast to the sign (sēmeion), the necessary sign (tekmerion) is not refutable—such as that it is necessarily true that a woman is pregnant because she has milk. The discussion of sign and necessary sign is expanded on in the *Prior Analytics* where we are told that “a sign [eikos] may be taken in three ways, corresponding to the ways the middle term in the figures is taken: for it is taken either as in the first figure, or as in the middle, or as in the third” (Smith 1989, 102–3). The emphases for understanding signs in the *Prior Analytics* are the importance of the middle term (for “what makes us know is evidence, and the middle term is most like this” 70b2) and the importance of bringing all forms of argumentation into the broader conception of syllogismos. For he claims that “[I]t should be explained that not only dialectical and demonstrative deductions come about through the figures previously mentioned, but also rhetorical ones, and absolutely any form of conviction whatever, arising from whatever discipline” (Smith 1989, 99).

While such an attempt to appropriate rhetorical argumentation into the theory of the syllogistic of the *Prior Analytics* seems viable, how probabilities, signs, and necessary signs are to be used as premises of enthymemes in the *Rhetoric* is still unclear. For if signs and necessary signs are argumentation forms in themselves (that is, one of the three figures), it is difficult to understand how they can be those things from which enthymemes are said. Perhaps the point is that enthymemes can be shaped in one of these forms of the figures but the *Rhetoric* never explicitly states that this is the case (though, if someone is familiar with the *Prior Analytics*, he would better understand these figures as they are used in *Rhetoric* 1.2, 1357). The closest thing that we have to such a statement is that enthymemes’ conclusions are drawn from probabilities when [the premises?] are based
upon things in general or things thought to occur commonly; from neces-
sary signs when from necessary signs, and from signs when their materials
is the general or the particular (2.25.8, 1402b13–23). Moreover, the fact
that probabilities, signs, and necessary signs are not mentioned at all from
1.3.7 (1359a) to 2.25.8 (1402b) makes understanding their role in the Rheto-
ric and their relationship (if any) to the idia and topoi even more problem-
atic. What is clearer, however, is that probabilities, signs, and necessary
signs—what the Prior Analytics understands as rhetorical argumentation—
are to be understood within the framework of the syllogistic of the Prior
Analytics.

Drawing conclusions

From the foregoing discussion, the first step in drawing conclusions is to
point out that enthymemes are said to be distinguished in three different
and seemingly unrelated ways. First, we are told that enthymemes, as de-
monstrative proofs, are distinguished as general (probabilities) and neces-
sary (signs and necessary signs) (1.2.14, 1357a22). We are then told that
enthymemes are distinguished as idia and topoi in common (1.2.21, 1358a1–
2). Finally, we are told that enthymemes are one of the common proofs (the
other is example) in contradistinction to the demonstrative proofs (2.20).
And, if we are to understand that 2.22 is to follow from 2.20, then
enthymemes are further distinguished as demonstrative and refutative, and
the topoi of 2.23, if they are to be understood to follow from the discussion
of 2.22, are also divided by this demonstrative (deiktikós)/refutative bi-
nary. The following chart depicts these differences.

Confusion arises in attempting to understand these different distinc-
tions; for the enthymeme is said to be a common proof (whatever common
proof means) in one distinction, yet, in another, we are told that demon-
strative proofs (eikota, sēmeia, and tekmēria) are the sources of this com-
mon proof. What does this mean? Moreover, if the enthymeme is a common
proof, then how do we reconcile its distinction as an idia, which is also
distinguished as specific/demonstrative in contrast to the topoi in common?
And, is the distinction demonstrative/refutative enthymeme to be under-
stood in light of the enthymeme being a common proof or derived from
topoi or an idia? That is, is the demonstrative/refutative distinction of 2.22
to be understood in light of the “enthymeme as idia” or the “enthymeme
derived from the topoi in common” or both or neither?
Moving on from these questions, it is not too difficult to understand what is meant by the individual statement that *probabilities* are sources of enthymemes especially when we understand that *probabilities* were an important part of Athenian rhetorical practice. Things become a bit more difficult in respect to *signs* and *necessary signs* though, as these are also common contemporary rhetorical terms and, as the *Prior Analytics* attempts to explain, argument forms of the figures. So, when the *Rhetoric* claims that enthymemes are said from *signs* and *necessary signs*, it seems that we
are to understand that these contemporary rhetorical terms can be organized as argument forms within the figures, with the necessary signs proving to be more assuredly demonstrated than the ordinary signs.

As demonstrative proofs, probabilities, signs, and necessary signs are not related to the idia which are also understood to be demonstrative in that they are specific to a particular field. We are not told that probabilities, signs, and necessary signs are limited to a specific field, but rather led to understand that they are more common to all fields but not common in the Aristotelian sense of common principles. Conversely, the idia are not said to be argumentative forms as are signs and necessary signs, but rather premises or first principles of a specific field. Thus, there is no apparent relationship between idia and probabilities, signs, and necessary signs.

As for the topics which are in common in Rhetoric 1.2, we are faced with the problem of whether or not they are common principles. They are never explicitly, and only remotely implicitly (following Slomkowski), said to be common principles in the sense that the principles of non-contradiction and excluded middle are common principles, but there are problems with this; for in addition to the problem of the need to grasp the topoi (as common principles) in order to understand anything whatsoever, if the topoi are construed as common principles, then their role and value in rhetorical discourse that, according to Rhetoric, involves itself with specific fields such as war and peace, self-defense, imports and exports, and so on become negligible if not questionable in light of comments within the Aristotelian corpus that align such general argumentation with empty or sophistic discourse. On the other hand, it is understandable how these topoi can be premise-conclusion argument forms according to Smith’s rendering, and in this sense, they share a similarity with signs and necessary signs in that both can be construed as premise-conclusion argument forms. Such an understanding of the topoi would also further indicate that the idia are not topoi because whereas the topoi are argument forms, the idia are merely premises (or first principles) of a specific field.

So, where does this leave us? I have attempted to demonstrate that the discussion of materials of enthymemes in the Rhetoric is exceptionally confusing. These materials of enthymemes do not relate in any recognizable way. Perhaps the text attempts to say something like this: “Enthymemes, which are rhetorical arguments, are developed from a wide variety of propositions and they can take a wide variety of premise-conclusion forms so long as they fit within one of the [three] forms of the figures. These sources include propositions that are immediately relevant to a particular field of
discourse (idia) and could possibly be the first principles of these fields of discourse (although we then risk leaving rhetoric), propositions that are common to all fields alike (topoi), things that usually happen (probabilities), and from argument forms that are derived from the figures (signs and necessary signs). That is, enthymemes can be derived from just about anything that people say.” However, any attempt to demonstrate that this is what is meant by the discussion in the Rhetoric is burdened with the conflicting and confusing conceptual baggage that accompanies each of these important terms.

It seems to me that the only reasonable response to the discussion of the materials of enthymemes in Rhetoric is to admit that it is exceptionally confusing and any attempt to reconcile the confusing discussion or any attempt to offer a unified understanding of the materials of enthymemes detrimentally simplifies these perplexing difficulties. Thus, rather than throwing one’s hands up in utter frustration (as I have been tempted to do), I suggest the following two courses of study. First, more work needs to be completed that will facilitate our understanding of the terms idia, ta koina, and topoi within the Aristotelian corpus. I am thinking that there is a particular problem with understanding the idia as first principles and then realizing that the idia of Rhetoric 1.5–15 are not idia as first principles, but rather common opinions (even though they are not ever called common opinions) or specific topics concerning the various fields discussed. On the other hand, though, if “straightness” and “line” can be construed as first principles (idia) in the Posterior Analytics, then it would seem that some discussion of, say, the distinctions of political realms in the Rhetoric, could also be considered first principles. The question of whether or not the topoi are to be understood as common principles also requires more consideration. Second, perhaps we need to give more consideration to the possible influence that hundreds of years of editorial work may have had on the corpus Aristotelicum. It does not seem to me to be too far-fetched to think that the glaring difficulties within the discussion of these important terms—idia, topoi, ta koina, and enthymeme (and others)—may be the result of later editors’ interpolations or later Peripatetic lecturers’ engagements with an earlier text. Perhaps we can begin to trace different lines of thought—such as, for example, differing views as to what ta koina are—and perhaps such an investigation will demonstrate that there are two very different but independently consistent strands of thought as to what, for example, ta koina are within the corpus Aristotelicum. Of course, even if there are different or conflicting and possibly independently consistent understand-
ings of these terms in the corpus, this alone does not demonstrate that these differences are due to later editorial work, but these in conjunction with the ancient testimony that speaks to this issue may help us to better understand what is going on in these texts. I do not think that these two different methodological approaches are necessarily mutually exclusive, but rather that they can compliment each other. In any event, what is clear is that there is much work still before us if we are to understand more clearly the nature of the materials from which enthymemes are said within the broader context of relevant Aristotelian texts, and I am hopeful that the exploratory nature of the problems proffered here will generate further discussion.

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Notes
I would especially like to thank Robin Smith (Department of Philosophy, Texas A&M) for his willingness to criticize and encourage my musings concerning the materials of enthymemes at times when he was busily engaged in his own responsibilities and projects. This essay profited a great deal from his careful eye for detail and his demand for “getting it right.” The remaining errors are entirely my own.

1. Probabilities, signs, and necessary signs are discussed in the Rhetoric at 1357a30–1357b25, 1359a6–9, and 1402b10–1403a16. The topoi are considered explicitly at 1358a10–35, 1396b20–1400b33, and somewhat less explicitly at 1377b16–21 and 1403b6–15. Examples (paradeigmata) and maxims (gnomē) are also said to be sources of enthymemes (1402b13–14 and 1394a22ff, respectively), but, due to space constraints, these will not be considered at much length in this discussion.

2. In addition to understanding the idia as topoi (48), Slomkowski (1997) cites only Rhetoric 1357a32ff as a proof text that probabilities and signs are materials of enthymemes, but does not address the problem of how topoi or idia are related to probabilities and signs. Rhetorical scholars such as Huseman (1994) and Kennedy (1991) do not acknowledge that a problem exists, and while Kennedy offers a few comments in footnotes concerning probabilities, signs, necessary signs, the topoi, and idia, he does not offer an explicit discussion of these terms and their possible relationship to one another. And, in a later study, Grimaldi (1980b) provides a helpful (albeit difficult to follow) discussion of these technical terms, but he does not address the broader problem that I am concerned with in this essay.

3. It is noteworthy that Grimaldi does not include tekmería here in his discussion of eikota and sêmeia as forms of probable argumentation. For, as he notes in his discussion of eikota and sêmeia, the tekmería (necessary signs) are demonstrative and, thus, irrefutable rather than probable (114–15). So, he could not claim that the topoi are “sources for constructing probable argumentation” for the tekmería as he does for eikota and sêmeia. This is another example of the confusion within his discussion.

4. This seems especially surprising to me. For if, as some suggest, the dialectical practice that is described in Book 8 of the Topics was the practice of the Academy, then Plato’s total neglect to even mention the concept of the topics or their role in that dialectical exchange is surprising. Plato’s silence seems even more striking if, as most hold, our Topics is one of Aristotle’s earliest works—even in progress while he was still at the Academy and it was under Plato’s direction.
5. This statement does, however, deserve further consideration. In the Rhetoric, examples of topoi are provided from texts that either preceded or were contemporary to Aristotle’s activity. This suggests that these predecessors or contemporaries offered argumentative statements (or forms) that were later classified as topical, but it does not suggest that those who wrote or spoke them considered them as topics themselves. As far as can be determined, only the compiler of the topics in the Rhetoric (and perhaps his, or their, immediate circle) probably understood these argumentative forms as topics. It seems anachronistic to suppose that earlier writers or speakers considered them as topics in the Aristotelian sense.

6. See Smith’s discussion of the relationship between the Aristotelian conception of topos and the practice of memorization in ancient Greece for a helpful background against which the term (topos) may be read (1997, 155–58).

7. In addition to topoi’s meaning of “place” or “region” (1372a32, 1361a33, and 1365a20), it is also used in the Isocratean sense of “subject” at 1362a13 and 1396b28–34.

8. I disagree with Kennedy when he states that “neither in Topics nor in Rhetoric does Aristotle give a definition of topos, another sign that he assumed the word would be easily understood; he does, however, give his own special twist to its meaning” (1991, 45). Although the definition(s) of topoi in the Rhetoric are somewhat vague for our liking, they are definitions nonetheless.

9. There are a host of problems with how Chapters 20 and following follow from the previous chapters of Book 2. In fact, even as Kennedy (1991, 163–64) and Wisse (1989, 9–43) note, Chapters 12 to 17 of Book 2 are awkwardly placed, unrelated to rhetorical discourse, and are certainly later editions to an earlier text. Chapters 18 and 19, likewise, seem awkwardly placed.

10. These common proofs are in contradistinction to the demonstrative proofs—probabilities, signs, and necessary signs—of 1.2 (1358a12). This distinction is also confusing because here enthymemes are distinguished as common proofs, but at 2.22 they are distinguished as demonstrative and refutative. Thus, we have a demonstrative, common proof, which seems like an oxymoron in Aristotelian nomenclature.

11. This is in sharp contrast to the claim at 1356a35–b5 that induction (along with the enthymeme) is the crux of rhetorical proofs. It is interesting, too, that Kassel double-bracks this passage in his edition of the text (1976, 11), and that neither Kennedy (1991, 181) nor Grimaldi (1980a, 2.257) comment upon it.

12. This discussion of the maxim seems out of place. As noted, the earlier plan was to discuss the two common proofs. The first, example, was discussed prior to this discussion of the maxim. The second common proof, the enthymeme, is discussed after this discussion of the maxim. I understand the discussion of the maxim here as another example of the disorganization of the text.

13. This echoes Rhetoric 1.4.7–13 (1359b18–1360b3) where the most important subjects of deliberation (war and peace, defense, imports and exports, and legislation) are discussed. It is important to note that this discussion in Book 1 ends with the statement that “All these things are the works of politicians, not of rhetoricians” (hapanta de tauta politikês all’ ou rhêtorikês ergon estin) (1360a37).

14. This phrase deserves brief comment. “Noting in passing” is the translation of parasemainomenoi. Kennedy translates the participle as “[w]hen we have made these things clear in a supplementary discussion,” and, in a footnote, states that “Chaps. 22–23 are thus a supplement, apparently added to the work at a late stage of its development” citing Düring’s Aristoteles: Darstellung und Interpretation seinen Denken (1991, 190 n. 167). The verb is used in only one other passage in the Aristotelian corpus, Topics 105b16, within the context of collecting premises from written works. Smith translates it there as “One should also make marginal notes (parasêmainomenoi) on the opinions of particular people” (1997, 12). There is no hint in the context of the Topics that the term means “supplemental discussion,” and even less of a hint that that which is to be noted is a later edition to the text. So, while I am more open to the idea that Chapters 22 and 23 are later additions to a text of the Rhetoric, I do not think that Kennedy is justified to say that the use of parasêmainomenoi proves this. Rather, the context seems similar to that of Topics 105b16, and I would thus stick with “noting in passing” or “while making marginal notes.”
15. See Smith’s discussions and notes on pages 118, 140, and 260 (1989). While Smith notes that this contrast between “probative” and impossible deductions “is related to a distinction in the Rhetoric between probative and ‘refutative’ (elenkikos) arguments,” he does not expand upon the passage in Rhetoric and, thus, offer any explanation how the discussion in Rhetoric relates, if at all, to the discussion of the rhetorical topos (which, of course, was not his purpose either).

16. I am translating deiktikon here as “demonstrative” because “probative” just does not seem to fit the context.

17. Deiktiko-s occurs in the Prior Analytics at 29a31, 33; 40b25, 45a26, 28, 36; 45b1, 14; 62b39, 40; 63b12, 20; and 65b4. Deiktikos occurs at Prior Analytics 41a33, 45b7–8, and Posterior Analytics 85b33.


19. In addition to the deiktikon (-ōs) passages cited above, see Pr. An. 41a10, 43b2, 7, 27, 28, and Po. An. 76a7, 76a17, 38, 40, and 76b3.

20. The passage in the Prior Analytics ends with “We have gone through this [establishing premises] in detail, however, in our treatise concerning dialectic” (46a29–30), and this would suggest that the discussion here in the Prior Analytics is similar to that in the Topics (1.14) that Grimaldi, Kennedy, Kassel, and Freese cite as the reference for the passage in the Rhetoric. In reference to the closing line of the passage in the Prior Analytics, Smith notes that the reference is normally taken to be the Topics (perhaps 1.14). But there is no discussion in the Topics that can plausibly be called a ‘more detailed account’ of what Aristotle has just gone through, and the discussion of ‘how premises are to be selected’ in Topics 1.14 seems very remote from the present subject. Since this sentence intrudes into an otherwise fairly cohesive line of argument in A30–31, I suggest it may be a later editor’s attempt (inspired by merely verbal similarity) at trying together the two passages. (1989, 159)

21. For recent discussions concerning the topos that attempt to explain what they are and their use(s) in the Rhetoric, but that do not address any of the concerns with how the topos relate to other “materials of enthymemes” that I am concerned with here, see, in addition to Smith and Slomkowski, Carolyn Miller’s “The Aristotelian Topos: Hunting for Novelty” (2000), Barbara Warnick’s “Two Systems of Invention: The topics in the Rhetoric and The New Rhetoric” (2000), and Ed Dyck’s “Topos and Enthymeme” (2002).

22. Both Kassel (1976, 16) and Ross (1959, 12) comment upon the passage, and Kennedy (1991, 45 n. 68) and Grimaldi (1980a, 1.72) offer possible explanations.

23. Kassel prefers koine- (feminine dative) to koinoi (masculine plural) (1976, 16).

24. Grimaldi claims that the idia are “particular topics” and that Aristotle will “use the word topos at times without distinction for both particular and general topics” (1980, 1.74). Slomkowski also understands the idia as topos. That idia are not topos will become more apparent in the following discussion.

25. Idia or idio-n is used at 102b38; 129a17; 130b5, 23, 30, 33; 132a11; 133b22; 134a26; and 143a31; eidos or eidē is 103a1, 107b33ff, 111a18ff, 120b12, 121a7ff, but always as species; and koine- (os) is used thirty-seven times in the Topics, but never in the technical sense in which it is used in the Rhetoric.

26. The following table charts the usage of these terms by fifth- and fourth-century writers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>eikos</th>
<th>semeion</th>
<th>tekmerion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Isocrates</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plato</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antiphon</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lysias</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isaeus</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demosthenes</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aeschines</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dinarchus</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lycurgus</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
27. To compare these terms in the *Rhetorica Ad Alexandrum* to their use in the *Rhetoric* see:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rhetorica Ad Alexandrum</th>
<th>Rhetoric</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1428a25–1428b11 (7)</td>
<td>Probabilities (eikos) 1357a32–33; 1359a6–7, and 1402b12–14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1430b30–1431a6 (12)</td>
<td>Signs (sêmeia) 1357a32–1357b25; 1402b12–1403a1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1430a14–1430a21 (9)</td>
<td>Tekmêria 1357a32–1357b25; 1402b12–1403a1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

28. Thus, Wisse is wrong, in my view, in his reluctance/refusal to use other Aristotelian texts in trying to understand the *Rhetoric* (1989, 12).

**Works Cited**


